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RIGHTS AND JUDGES IN A
DEMOCRACY: A NEW CANADIAN
VERSIONt
Paul C. Weiler*
On both sides of the Canadian-American b,order, the last decade has been an exciting time for those interested in the perennial problem of what should be the role of courts in protecting
fundamental rights in a democracy. The United States has witnessed a remarkable flourishing of constitutional theory reflecting on the appropriate scope and method of its long-established
institution of judicial review. 1 In Canada, public life has been
absorbed in a debate over the even more basic issue of whether
Canadian judges should have any such constitutional role at all.
Canadians sought a constitutionally entrenched Charter of
Rights not just for its own sake, but also as part of a larger effort
at constitutional renewal. The hope was that such a Charter
would preserve a united Canada in the face of the serious threat
posed by French Canadian nationalism within a potentially independent Quebec. 2 In this Article, I comment on those features

t Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan Law School on
Oct. 31, 1983.
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; former MacKenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies, Harvard University.
1. Within the voluminous literature of the last few years, there exist some notable
book-length treatments of this subject. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
2. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is Part I (§§ 1-34) of the Constitution Act,
1982. At the request of the Canadian Parliament, the United Kingdom Parliament, by
means of the Canada Act, 1982, formally enacted this law in order to incorporate the
existing Canadian constitutional documents (in particular, the British North America
Act of 1867, as amended since then) in the new Constitution Act, 1982, and to create a
new domestic procedure for amending the Canadian Constitution in the future (§§ 3849). The Canada Act, 1982, thereupon terminated the future authority of the United
Kingdom Parliament over Canada.
The best succinct analysis of the legal background to, and potential meaning of, each
of the provisions of the new constitution, including the Charter, is P. HOGG, THE CANADA
ACT, 1982 ANNOTATED (1982). The best scholarly account of the historical, political and
legal aspects of the constitutional struggle is AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT (K. Banting & R. Simeon ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited
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of the Canadian debate and its denouement that are noteworthy
within the Canadian context, as well as those that illustrate
some of the universal themes of constitutional theory.
The first question that might occur to an American is why
there might even be a heated debate about putting the people's
rights into the constitution. 3 In fact, this proposal was strongly
favored by the Canadian public:' It had a powerful champion in
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who considered the Charter the
major legacy of his fifteen years in power. Opposition to the
Charter, however, came from almost all the provincial government leaders, who voiced in practical, down-to-earth terms the
theoretical criticisms developed by a number of serious constitutional scholars. 11
The source of the provincial leaders' concern was the same as
the source of the Charter's popular attraction: observation of
Canada's next-door neighbor's two centuries of experience with
constitutionalized rights. The lesson that Canadians gleaned
from the American experience with the institutiqn is that the
as AND No ONE CHEERED). A fine journalistic account of the critical events from the
spring of 1980 to the spring of 1982 is R. SHEPPARD & M. VALPY, THE NATIONAL DEAL
(1982).
3. As background to this account, one should know that in 1960 Canada did achieve a
Bill of Rights. See W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN B1LL OF RIGHTS (Rev. ed. 1975). This
legal statement of the rights of Canadians was, however, contained in a simple Act of
Parliament. Consequently, it was theoretically repealable in the same way and was applicable only to federal, not provincial, government action; all of which led the Supreme
Court of Canada to denude the Bill of any significant legal force. The proponents of a
constitutionally entrenched Charter saw this new legal status as the solution to deficiencies in the old Bill of Rights. See Tarnopolsky, The Historical and Constitutional Context of the Proposed Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1981, at 169 (1981) (presenting as good a statement as any of this
position).
4. Although American commentators living in Canada often depict Canadians as
more concerned with order than liberty, see E. FRIEDENBERG, DEFERENCE TO AUTHORITY:
THE CASE OF CANADA (1980); Kaufman, Canada: An American Discovers Its Difference,
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1983 (Magazine), at 61, the Canadian public actually strongly supported the proposed Charter. The Gallup Poll of July 1980 disclosed that 91 % of
Canadians supported a Charter of Rights and only two percent were opposed. See D.
HOFFMAN, WHo's AFRAID OF A BILL OF RIGHTS? 1 n.2 (1981). Another public opinion survey in April 1981, taken at the height of the federal-provincial battle about constitutional change, found that 84 % of all respondents still favored the Charter and 63 %
strongly supported it. This proportion was considerably more than even the proportion
supporting patriation of the Canadian Constitution from Britain. See Ackerman & Charney, Canada at the Constitutional Crossroads, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 129 n.31 (1982).
5. Among the best pre-Charter critiques of constitutionalizing rights in Canada are
Russell, A Democratic Approach to Civil Liberties, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 109 (1969);
Schmeiser, The Case Against Entrenchment of A Canadian Bill of Rights, 1 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 15 (1973); and Smiley, The Case Against the Charter of Rights, 2 CAN. J. PoL. Sci.
277 (1969). A post-Charter piece in the same vein is Macdonald, Postscript and Prelude-the Jurisprudence of the Charter: 8 Theses, 4 SuP. CT. L. REv. 321 (1982).
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merit of a constitutional Charter of Rights depends less on the
abstract values expressed in the legal document than on the solution to the practical problem of translating those principles
into sensible real-life judgments. Is it better to rely on an informal sense of self-restraint on the part of elected political leaders
or on enforcement of a written constitution by an independent
judiciary? A comparison of the records in the two countries by
no means indicated that, even without constitutional backing,
the rights of Canadians were more in jeopardy than those of
Americans. 6
Disagreement over the Charter has been a major theme in the
constitutional controversy that has engaged the Canadian federation for the last two decades, 7 a controversy that has called into
•
6. A nice recent illustration of this point concerns the death penalty, which has, in
the last decade or two, raised popular emotions on both sides of the border. The United
States Supreme Court has backed and filled on the question of whether and when capital
punishment is constitutionally permissible. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Notwithstanding the numerous obstacles the Court has placed in its path, the death penalty is gaining momentum in the
United States. See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908
(1982). The Supreme Court of Canada refused even to countenance the argument that
such a substantive moral issue might be the subject of serious judicial scrutiny under the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause in our statutory Bill of Rights. See Miller v. The
Queen, [1977) 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.) (one of the series of decisions that drew almost all the
teeth from that document and helped propel us towards constitutional entrenchment).
But at the very time that the Court was giving us this hands-off verdict, the Canadian
Parliament was voting to repeal the death penalty, see P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 46, a
position it has maintained since then in the face of substantial popular opinion to the
contrary. See Special Report: Hanging, MACLEAN's, Oct. 8, 1984, at 48.
I do not suggest that this type of comparison is decisive as to the worth of the constitutional rights. One could as easily argue that differences in both the nature of the crime
problem in the two countries and the resulting public mood made this an easier issue for
Canadian politicians to handle without constitutional restraints, and that with the addition of the latter the Canadian polity might do even better than it has. My point in this
example is that one cannot resolve that question by a priori reasoning about the value of
the ideals expressed in a proposed constitutional document. The issue ultimately turns
on more practical, institutional considerations.
7. The manner in which the specific issue of constitutionalizing rights was confronted
in Canada tended to reinforce the division between the two positions. See generally R.
SHEPPARD & M. VALPY, supra note 2. In his final effort to solve the issue, Prime Minister
Trudeau introduced a resolution in the Canadian Parliament in October 1980 that would
lead to patriation of the Canadian Constitution with both a domestic amending formula
and a Charter of Rights. This Resolution was referred to a Joint Committee of the House
of Commons and the Senate of Canada to hear representations from the public and to
consider revisions to the initial proposals.
In the Joint Committee, consideration of the Charter focused almost exclusively on its
substantive content. The tenor of the discussion and movement in this forum indicated
that the reach of the Charter had to be expanded and its language tightened up to insure
that no one's rights were left uncovered. The placement of unequal treatment on account
of age or disability on the same constitutional plane as race or religion in § 15 of the
Charter, with little or no regard to whether any such addition made sense in institutional
terms, exemplified this concern.
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question all aspects of our governmental arrangements. The
seemingly endless debate climaxed in a final Conference of First
Ministers in November 1981. The result was an Accord on the
Charter-as well as a formula for patriation and amendment of
the Constitution-embodying a compromise that most Canadian
commentators considered to be a distasteful political expedient
worked out in the wee hours of the morning. 8 I suggest, however,
that Canadians in fact devised a rather ingenious alternative
both to the British parliamentary sovereignty which we inherited and to the American practice of judicial supremacy over
fundamental rights which has so long beguiled us.
Before describing this solution and enumerating its virtues, let
us examine in the Canadian context the perennial and universal
dilemma of rights and judges in a democracy. The conflict has
its roots in the fact that in a society civilized enough to adopt
and live by a Charter of Rights, the kinds of cases likely to arise
under such a document rarely have clear-cut answers, as a matter of either moral principle or legal interpretation. Thus, by
putting these rights in its constitution, a nation in fact transfers
the final authority for settling inherently contestable dilemmas
about the appropriate limits of public action from the political
to the judicial branch of government.

I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LANGUAGE RIGHTS

Illustrations of the moral controversy in real-life constitutional cases abound; for example, the abortion issue has
produced constitutional causes celebres in the United States,
West Germany, and elsewhere. 9 I will focus on the language
The Government of Canada, consistent with Canadian constitutional tradition, sought
to achieve the consent of the provinces to this constitutional package through conferences of Federal and Provincial ministers both before and after the October Resolution.
In this forum, the First Ministers focused on the grand question of whether there should
be constitutional entrenchment at all. They paid little or no attention to the content of
particular rights (language being the one exception, for reasons to be noted shortly) and
very little to the suggestion that some rights might more appropriately and safely be
entrenched than others.
8. Prime Minister Trudeau responded to a final question at a press conference asking
him what he thought of the recent Accord: " 'You are asking me now if I consider it a
success? No, I consider it an abject failure!' He abruptly stood up and walked hurriedly
outside into the rain and his waiting black limousine, leaving the riddle behind him." R.
SHEPPARD & M. VALPY, supra note 2, at 322.
9. While the United States Supreme Court struck down restrictive American abortion laws, holding that they unduly infringed on a woman's freedom of choice, see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the West German Constitutional Court found the liberalized

'
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issue 10 for it has been as central to the Canadian experience with
rights and constitutions as race has been in the United States.
In fact, securing minority language rights was the principal motivation for Prime Minister Trudeau's making the Charter the
centerpiece of his project for constitutional renewal of Canadian
federalism.
The peculiar features of the language issue in Canada are vividly illustrated in our most famous civil rights controversy, the
Manitoba School Crisis of the 189O's. u In that case, the French
Catholic minority asserted its right to have "separate but equal"
education in its own schools funded out of the public coffers.
The French considered oppressive the English-dominated provincial . legislature's attempt to force all students, including
French Catholics, into a single, "integrated" public school system.12 Paradoxically, the Manitoba minority lost that struggle 13
German Jaw unconstitutional because it gave insufficient protection to the fetus' right to
life, see Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 39 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 1. See generally Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and
West Germany, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 255 (1977). The Parliamentary Committee also considered the subject of abortions in its deliberations about the content of the Canadian
Charter. Because there were powerful interest groups on each side of the question, however, this was one issue as to which the parliamentarians saw discretion to be the better
part of valor and left the relevant provisions of the Charter oblique on the matter. Both
sides have now propelled the controversy into the judicial arena. See infra notes 84-85.
10. The best overview of the language issue in Canada is R. WARDHAUGH, LANGUAGE
AND NATIONHOOD: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (1983). My sketch of the problem here
draws on an earlier piece, Weiler, Writing a Constitution to Protect Minorities: The
Canadian Experience, in MINORITIES: COMMUNITY AND lnENTITY 315 (C. Fried ed. 1983).
11. The best short account of the Manitoba School Crisis is T. BERGER, FRAGILE
FREEDOMS 58-92 (1981). The technical legal issues are explored in D. SCHMEISER, C1v1L
LIBERTIES IN CANADA 158-69 (1964). A fine book-length study is P. CRUNICAN, PRIESTS
AND POLITICIANS; MANITOBA SCHOOLS AND THE ELECTION OF 1896 (1974).
12. This testifies to the differences between race and language. While each constitutes an external badge of identity-thus the basis for invidious discrimination-language poses a rather more profound problem. Not only does it shape the way an
individual thinks and views the world, language is also an inherently social activity. It is
not enough to have a constitutional right to speak the language of one's choice. One
needs to have listeners who can understand.
Those who support linguistic equality, then, are not simply against adverse negative
treatment on account of one's mother tongue, but also for the positive social conditions
within which one's language and culture can survive and flourish. The key vehicle for
resisting assimilation into a "language-blind society" is education, through which not
just the language but also the history, culture, and sense of group identity are transmitted to the young. I should note that in Canadian constitutional history, there was an
intimate connection between language and religion in the understanding of minority
rights, and that is why I refer throughout to the French-Catholic minority.
13. The initial response of the French Catholics in Manitoba was to try to assert
their constitutional rights. The narrow construction which the British Privy Council
placed on this legal restraint on Parliamentary sovereignty, see City of Winnipeg v. Barrett, 1892 A.C. 445 (P.C.) (Can.), however, frustrated this tack. Despite this defeat, the
Privy Council found that Canada's highly centralized, quasi-federal constitution also
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largely because Canada's French Catholic Prime Minister, Wilfred Laurier, considered it essential to defend the principle of
provincial autonomy just then emerging within the Canadian
federal regime. Laurier believed that this constitutional principle was vital to the Quebecois (the French in Quebec), because it
would keep the authority over education and other areas of public life in the hands of the provincial government in Quebec City,
the only government in North America whose constituency was
predominantly French.
In these fateful events of nearly a century ago lie the seeds of
the modern Canadian dilemma. In fact, throughout the 1970's
Canada witnessed an eerie replay of the contest between the
strategy of individual constitutional rights as the ideal technique
for protecting the French Canadian minority-the position of
Trudeau and his federal government in Ottawa-and the alternative of provincial rights (or even more radical forms of
Quebecois nationalism)-now identified with Quebec Premier
Rene Levesque and his Parti Quebecois. 14
The virtues of the individual rights strategy are evident:
through a constitutional guarantee of individual language rights,
Canada could undo its past injustice towards the French Canadian minority as exemplified by the Manitoba School case. Such
measures would, it was hoped, avert the serious threat to Canadian unity posed by the coexistence of two linguistically separate
Canadas, the French in Quebec and the English everywhere
else. 15 As Trudeau has argued since his days as a constitutional
provided a protective jurisdiction of the central government against denial of minority
language education rights by the provinces. See Brophy v. Attorney-General of Manitoba, 1895 A.C. 202 (P.C.). Charles Tupper, the English Protestant leader of the thenincumbent Canadian Government, introduced legislation in Ottawa to roll back Manitoba's new education policy, but this measure was opposed by Laurier's Liberals. The
Liberals forced and won an election on the issue in 1896 and negotiated a compromise
with the Manitoba Premier which effectively denied the French-Catholics their own
schools in that province.
14. The best treatment in English of the ferment in Quebec is K. McRoBERTS & D.
PoSGATE, QUEBEC: SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL CRISIS (Rev. ed. 1980). A succinct statement of the issues is A. BERNARD, WHAT DoES QUEBEC WANT? (1978). There is a nice
summary of the contrasting positions of Trudeau and Levesque in TRENT, Common
Ground and Disputed Territory, in MusT CANADA FAIL? 139 (R. Simeon ed. 1977).
15. While French Canadians were 25.7% of the Canadian population in 1971, they
were 80';,, of the population of Quebec, and just 4.4% of the rest of Canada. Indeed, if
one views the 190,000 Francophones in Northwest New Brunswick and the 270,000 in
Eastern Ontario as part of a single Quebec and "contact regions," Francophones comprise only 1.5% of the rest of Canada (which constitutes two-thirds of the Canadian
population as a whole). The population figures in this note and in most of those that
follow are drawn from R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, THE DEMOLINGUISTIC SITUATION IN
CANADA (1982), in particular the comprehensive census tables in the book's Appendix.
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law professor in Montreal, 16 only if effective legal guarantees
against unfriendly provincial governments solidify the precarious situation of the French language outside Quebec will the
Quebecois be able to consider all of Canada their homeland,
throughout which they can travel and live with confidence in
governmental support of their linguistic and cultural heritage.
Although entrenchment of his Official Languages policy at the
federal level was an important constitutional goal for Trudeau,
his major aim was to prod provincial governments to provide education rights to their French Canadian minorities.
It required the election in the late 1970's of a separatist government in Quebec for English Canada finally to accept this position.17 By that time, though, bitter opposition to these federal
remedial measures had emerged within Quebec. Sophisticated
Quebecois felt that this legal lifeline had come a century too late
to make the French language viable outside their province. They
believed that the tug of assimilation in an urban industrialized
society would inevitably trump whatever legal rights were written into a constitution. 16 They were also concerned that the
price of using a constitution in the quixotic quest for linguistic
equality would be reciprocal limitations on the freedom of action
of the French inside Quebec.
This issue was not merely symbolic in the 1970's. The
Quebecois were alarmed over the incipient decline· in the French
proportion of the Quebec population, especially in Montreal, the
flagship of French Canada. 19 This gloomy trend was attributable
16. See his collected essays in P.E. TRUDEAU, FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS
(1968). A position paper of his, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, A NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
(1977), expressed the same point of view.
17. Nevertheless, there remained the ever present possibility of English backlash, as
exhibited in the air traffic control dispute of 1976. See S. BoRINS, THE LANGUAGE OF THE
SKIES (1983).
18. See R. Beaugot, A Demographic View of Canadian Language Policy, 5 CAN. Pue.
PoL'Y 16 (1979); GUINDON, The Modernization of Quebec, in MODERNIZATION AND THE
CANADIAN STATE 244 (1978); Vaillancourt, La Charte de la Langue Francaise du Quebec,
4 CAN. Pue. PoL'v 284 (1978). The tug of assimilation became evident in the more elaborate census data of 1971. That year, of 1,421,000 Canadians of French origin living
outside of Quebec, 926,000 had the French language as their mother tongue and 676,000
had French as their home language. That meant that more than one-third of the Canadians with French ancestry did not learn French as their first language in their parents'
home and, of those who did, more than one-quarter no longer used French in their own
home, teaching it to their children. Especially endangered species were those in Western
Canada: 11,000 Francophones in British Columbia, 25,000 in Alberta, and 15,000 in Saskatchewan. While there remained 40,000 of French mother tongue in Manitoba, this was
only 6.1 % of the provincial population, and the same stark process of assimilation had
taken place: 8.8% of Manitobans were of French origin, but just 4.0% used it as their
home language. See R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, supra note 15.
19. Jacques Henripin, the leading French Canadian demographer, looked at the de-
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to the fact that, given the choice between adopting French or
English as a family language, at least twice as many non-English-speaking entrants to Quebec were choosing English. This
trend was most pronounced in Montreal.2° The economic dominance of the anglophone community in Quebec 21 and the consequent fact that proficiency in English was more advantageous to
one's prospects than was proficiency in French22 made English
the preferred language of the newcomers to the provlnce, and
their children flocked to the English schools rather than to the
French ecoles. Thus, although the individual choices were eminently reasonable for each family concerned, cumulatively they
posed a profound threat to the continuing existence of French
language and culture in what had been considered its sole safe
harbor in North America.
From this situation emerged a comprehensive language policy
in Quebec which culminated in passage of the Charter of the
French Language in 1977. 23 A crucial feature of this provincial
law was restriction of freedom of choice in the language of education. 24 The established English-language school system is predining birth rate of the Quebecois and the growing tendency of immigrants to assimilate
into the English community in Quebec and projected a drop in the French share of Quebec from 82.5% in 1951 to a range of 71.6%-79.2% by 2001, and in Montreal from 62%
in 1961 to a range of 52-62% by 2001. See K. McRoBERTS & D. PosGATE, supra note 14,
at 132-33. Naturally enough, the concerned Quebecois focused on the lower end of this
scale. See W. Johnson, Demographics Fed the Paranoia, The Globe and Mail, Jan. 11,
1984 at 8.
20. Of Quebecers with an Allophone origin (meaning neither French nor English),
27.4% had English as a mother tongue in 1971, while only 15.7% had French. See K.
McROBERTS & D. PosGATE, supra note 14, at 132. This phenomenon occurred at a time
when four out of five allophones would have had to opt for French just to maintain the
balance within the province.
21. In 1971, the average male English worker earned 28% more than the male French
worker. See S. ARNOPOULOS & D. CLIFT, THE ENGLISH FACT IN QUEBEC 239, Table 14
(1980). Even after controlling for human capital variables, there remained a seven percent differential. See Vaillancourt, supra note 18, at 293. In any event, for purposes of
language attractiveness to newcomers, gross disparities in income and occupation are
likely to be influential. As if to add insult to injury, whereas in 1961 French-speaking
Quebecers ranked 12th in average income by ethnic group in the province, ahead of only
the Italians and native Canadians, see LESLIES, Ethnic Hierarchies and Minority Consciousness in Quebec, in MusT CANADA FAIL?, supra note 14, at 107, 108, by 1971 they
had dropped to 13th, now trailing the Italians, see A. Bernard, supra note 14, at 159.
22. Taking the 1970 earnings of the unilingual Francophone as 100, being a bilingual
Francophone added 40 points to one's income level. Being bilingual, however, added almost nothing to the Anglophone edge. That figure rose only one point, from 167 to 168.
See Vaillancourt, supra note 18, at 292.
23. QuE. REV. STAT. ch. C-11 (1977). In GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC, QUEBEC'S POLICY OF
THE FRENCH LANGUAGE (1977), the Parti Quebecois spelled out the rationale of its language policy.
24. Sections 72 and 73 of the Charter of the French language defined the new regime
for language of education. Another major feature of the Charter, in my view the more
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served for the children of English-speaking Quebecers who were
educated in the system themselves; nevertheless, children of
newcomers to the province are barred from those schools. The
law dictates that anyone who moves permanently to Quebec (i.e.,
for more than three years) must send his children to French
public school, just as he would do if he were settling in France.
Unhappily for Rene Levesque, this feature of his Charter, which
sought to preserve the French language in Quebec, conflicted directly with the aim and content of Trudeau's constitutional
Charter, 25 which proposed to secure educational rights in Quebec
for English Canadians as the price of comparable educational
rights for the French in all the other provinces.
Given the experience in the United States of states' rights (especially in the South) cast in opposition to equality for blacks,
the notion of provincial autonomy as a strategy for protecting a
minority group may seem ludicrous to most Americans. The tac~
tic, however, would appear more plausible if, in the United
States, ninety-five percent of blacks lived in one large state,
where they constituted eighty percent of the population, and if
the national constitution prevented the state's government from
taking affirmative action to redress what it considered to be the
current impact of historic domination by the state's white minority. This hypothetical situation captures the actual situation
of Quebec in Canada, giving rise to the major moral ambiguity
bedeviling the Canadian quest for a constitutional Charter of
Rights.
I shall defer an assessment of the relative merits of the two
constitutional visions I have sketched 26 until later in this Article.
For the moment, let this account of the bitter contest between
important in the longer run, attempts to alter the environment within which individual
education choices are made, in particular by requiring that French be the language of
work in the province. Elaborate "Francization" programs now require Quebec businesses
to make French the normal language of workplace communication, supervision, instruction, manuals, labor-management relations, etc. Supporters of the programs expect that
when immigrants to Quebec realize that being French is a necessary condition to getting
ahead in their jobs, they will respond by sending their children to French language
schools. See E. MCWHINNEY, QUEBEC AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1960-1978, at 60-61 (1979).
25. See Constitution Act, 1982, § 23. See generally Magnet, Minority Language Educational Rights, 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 195 (1983); Tetley, Language and Education Rights
in Quebec and Canada, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 177 (1982).
26. I might add that essentially the same contest between the constitutional strategies of individual legal rights and group self-government took place in connection with
the native peoples of Canada. See McNeil, The Constitutional Right of the Aboriginal
Peoples of Canada, 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 255 (1983); Sanders, The Indian Lobby, in AND
No ONE CHEERED, supra note 2, at 301. Recently, a Report of the Special Committee of
the House of Commons of Canada, INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA (1983), has
largely endorsed the latter approach.
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the two foremost champions of the French Canadian minority
serve simply as an illustration of the larger truth: in a country
like Canada, the typical "rights" case has no single, obviously
correct answer, but rather presents a subtle moral choice between individual claims and community needs.
II.

THE OPEN TEXTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

To grant that fundamental rights cases rarely have clear-cut
moral solutions is not, of course, to imply that putting these
rights in a constitution necessarily means expanding judicial
power. An alternative hypothesis is that since the framers of a
constitution commit themselves to one side or the other of the
moral dilemma-as they seemed to do in adopting the Trudeau
position on language-courts need only interpret and apply the
judgments that have been made elsewhere. 27
American constitutional scholars label this position the "interpretivist thesis." 28 In many respects, the Canadian experience
provides ample corroboration for their critique. 29 As befits a document intended to stand as a national ideal for a century or
more, the Canadian Charter is written in broad moral terms. It
establishes the right not to be deprived of "life, liberty and security . . . except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice" 30 and "the right to the equal protection . . . and
benefit of the law without discrimination." 31 The Charter bars
"cruel and unusual ... punishment," 32 "unreasonable search
and seizure," 33 and arbitrary arrest and detention. 34 Open-textured language such as this invites-indeed, requires-the court
27. As Judge Skelly Wright put it: "Constitutional choices are in fact different from
ordinary [policy] decisions. The reason is simple: the most important value choices have
already been made by the framers of the Constitution." Wright, Professor Bickel, The
Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 784 (1971).
28. The most vigorous exponent of "interpretivism" is Raoul Berger. See R. BERGER
supra note 1; see also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
29. The most effective critique of interpretivism is Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-500 (1981). See also J. ELY, supra note 1, at 11-41; Brest, The
Misconceived Quest For The Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Richards, Constitutional Interpretation, History and the Death Penalty: A Book Review, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1372 (1983).
30. The Constitution Act, 1982, § 7 (emphasis added).
31. Id., § 15 (emphasis added).
32. Id., § 12 (emphasis added).
33. Id., § 8 (emphasis added).
34. Id., § 9 (emphasis added).
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to confront directly the moral controversies it presents.
The Canadian Charter is, in fact, considerably more candid
about this than is the American Bill of Rights. Unlike the American Constitution with its blanket statements of rights such as
"freedom of speech," which have allowed some American judges
to adopt an absolutist interpretation of their legal force, 35 the
Canadian Charter opens with the caveat that its guarantees are
subject to "such reasonable limits ... as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." 36 This provision qualifies even rights such as language rights, which are otherwise expressed in fairly specific terms. Canada's broad limitations
clause accords with the general approach of postwar constitution
writers around the world 37 and also accords in principle, if not in
detail, with American constitutional jurisprudence. Experience
has demonstrated that although in the abstract such fundamental rights as freedom of speech may seem unabridgable, in practice they must be restricted when they conflict with the rights of
others or with the needs of the community. In the Canadian
context, the evolution of section 1 of the Charter clearly indicates that the judiciary, not Parliament, is the institution responsible for drawing the line. 38
35. Notably Justice Hugo Black. See P. BoBBITI, supra note 1, at 25-38.
36. Constitution Act, 1982, § 1.
37. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights not only subjects freedom of expression, for instance, to such limitations "as are necessary in a democratic
society," but also specifies that such justifications may consist of "national security, territorial integrity or public safety, ... the prevention of disorder or crime, ... the protection of health or morals, ... the protection of the reputation or rights of others, . . .
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or . . . maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary." Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in,
W. TARN0P0LSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: COMMENTARY, app. 3 (1982). Similarly, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights subjects the rights of freedom of conscience and religion to legal limitations "necessary ... [f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others [and] ... [f]or
the protection of national security or of public order ... or of public health or morals."
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in W. TARNOP0LSKY & G. BEAUDOIN,
supra, at app. 4.
38. Like the international conventions quoted supra note 37, the predecessors to § 1
of the Charter, which were proposed in the abortive Victoria Charter of 1971 and in the
Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978, contained lists of countervailing interests such
as public safety, order, health, morals, peace and security that would justify legislative
restriction of fundamental rights. These lists were dropped in the version proposed in
October 1980 in favor of a reference to "such reasonable limits as are generally accepted
in a free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government" (emphasis
added). That language produced an outcry from groups such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association who feared (correctly, I believe) that the Canadian courts would read
this as endorsing the acceptability of just about any limitation duly enacted by a Canadian parliament in what was a comparatively free and democratic society. The Liberal
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If the bare language of the Charter, then, gives little legal direction, a judge might attempt to go beyond the words of the
document to discover what its authors intended when they wrote
it. If studying the framer's intent could ever be a fruitful exercise, it would surely be so in the case of the Canadian Charter,
which, unlike the centuries-old United States Bill of Rights, is a
contemporary document developed by officials who were thoroughly aware of the controversies produced by comparable constitutional language just south of the border.
Unhappily, searching for the framers' intent leads only into
another blind alley. Even leaving aside the virtually insoluble
questions of whose intentions are to count, 39 or what the notion
of collective intent means, what a Canadian judge would actually
discover on such a quest would be of only limited value. The
Canadian debate took place almost entirely on the plane of abstract concepts, such as how to express the notion of equality
before the law or what are the reasonable limits appropriate in a
free and democratic society. The participants in the debate left
little indication of their conceptions of what these were to mean
in real life situations. For example, one would search in vain in
the debates over the Charter for any serious discussion about
how the section 2(b) guarantee of "freedom of the press"" 0 might
square with competing values such as the section 11 right to a
"fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal. " 41 Accommodation of these two rights in the context of
Government responded with the current language which requires that the limitations be
"demo~strably justified" to a judiciary considering the ideals of a "free and democratic
society" as such. See P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 9-13; Christian, The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, U. BRIT.
CoLuM. L. REV. 105 (Charter ed. 1982).
Comparable expansion of judicial authority at the expense of the legislature took place
with respect to the police powers of arrest, search, and bail. These powers are now restrained by the Charter not just when they flout grounds and procedures "established by
law," but also when they can be labeled "arbitrary" or "unreasonable." See Constitution
Act, 1982, §§ 8 (search), 9 (detention), & ll(e) (bail).
39. For example, is it the intention of the Trudeau Government which is to count, or
is it that of the all-party Parliamentary Committee, the Canadian Parliament itself, the
Federal-Provincial First Ministers Conference, or even the Government of the United
Kingdom which finally passed the Canada Act?
40. Constitution Act, 1982, § 2(b).
41. Id., § ll(d). The major exception to that generalization is language, the distinctive Canadian constitutional right whose parameters were thoroughly aired before fairly
specific decisions were made about their scope in §§ 16-23 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
As I noted above, abortion was also a prominent subject for debate. The framers, however, failed to give any specific guidance as to whose "life, liberty and security" were to
be protected by § 7 of the Charter, that of the woman, the fetus, or neither. See Hosek,
Women and Constitutional Change, in AND No ONE CHEERED, supra note 2, at 280, 287295; cf. Borowski v. Attorney-General of Canada and Minister of Fin. of Canada, 4
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pretrial publicity, together with review of the law of libel, obscenity, and sedition, was simply left to the judiciary to work
out.
Perhaps Canadian judges could retreat to this final haven of
self-restraint. If they were to assume that the current shape of
Canadian law reflects the needs and aspirations of a "free and
democratic society," this legal pattern would establish a benchmark by which to police future government action, as well as to
scrutinize any provincial laws that radically deviated from the
basic Canadian consensus. Yet it is fair to say that the authors
of the Charter meant to preclude that judicial option, although
to say this may not be a decisive argument against it. In fact, it
was widely supposed that the Supreme Court of Canada's adoption of precisely this narrow view of the statutory Bill of Rights
was largely responsible for that document's lack of influence on
the quality of Canadian law. 42 Proponents of the new Charter
sought to alter this attitude of judicial self-abnegation; thus, the
drafters carefully removed any language that might support
transplanting the so-called "frozen concepts" fallacy of the Bill
of Rights into the new constitutional Charter.

D.L.R.4th 112 (Sask. Q.B. 1983).
Actually § 7 itself is a textbook illustration of the spongy quality of constitutional
language. Its predecessor, § l(a) of the old Bill of Rights, proscribed deprivation of "life,
liberty, and security of the person" except by "due process of law." The Charter substituted the phrase "except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Apparently the intent of its authors in the Department of Justice was thereby to limit the
scope of judicial scrutiny to matters of "fair procedure," as opposed to the "substantive
... policy of the law in question." See P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 29. I daresay that only
a constitutional lawyer could suppose that "fundamental justice" means fair procedure
while "due process" encompasses substantive policy.
42. The old Bill of Rights referred to rights which "have existed and shall continue to
exist" (§ 1) and which are "herein recognized and declared" (§ 2). That led one wing of
the Supreme Court to suppose that "the Bill was not concerned with 'human rights and
fundamental freedoms' in any abstract sense, but rather with such 'rights and freedoms'
as they existed in Canada immediately before the statute was enacted." Robertson v.
The Queen, 41 D.L.R.2d 485, 491 (Can. 1963). From that perspective it was only natural
to conclude, as regards the death penalty, for example, that since the latter was part of
Canadian criminal law at the time the Bill of Rights was passed and was reaffirmed by
Parliament in Criminal Code Amendments just a year later, it could not have been intended to be "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights.
Miller v. The Queen, [1977) 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.). See generally Tarnopolsky, The Historical and Constitutional Context of the Proposed Charter, supra note 3.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA

The Legitimacy of Judicial Authority in a Democracy

It was a formidable document that finally emerged in the Parliamentary Resolution of April 1981; a written charter containing such abstract notions as liberty, equality, fundamental justice, and the "restraints appropriate in a free and democratic
society" would now govern Canadian political life. Ultimate responsibility for divining the meaning of these essentially moral
concepts was passed to a Canadian judiciary and legal profession
that had almost no experience in using them and that had in
fact shied away from such a role under the statutory Bill of
Rights. The debates leading up to the Charter offered the courts
almost no guidance for resolving the specific controversies that
they would soon confront. The one unmistakable clue in the language and history of the Charter was that the judges in their
inquiries should not feel bound by the current state of Canadian
law.

Small wonder, then, that the Parliamentary Resolution evoked
grave concern among most provincial governments, whose consent was required in order for Trudeau and his government in
Ottawa to effect such a major constitutional change. 43 Notably,
serious objections to the Charter were raised by persons across
the Canadian political spectrum: Allen Blakeney, the social democratic leader from Saskatchewan; Sterling Lyon, the conservative premier of Manitoba; Rene Levesque, chief spokesman for
Quebecois nationalism; and Peter Lougheed, the lightning rod
for Wes tern Canadian regionalism. 44 The concerns expressed by
these Canadian political leaders were essentially those which
American constitutionalists would anticipate. We shall look
closely at these provincial objections, for understanding them is
43. This was the somewhat ambivalent verdict of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1981).
One majority of the judges held that as a matter of narrow constitutional law, Ottawa
could unilaterally ask the United Kingdom government in Westminster to revise the existing Canadian Constitution. Another majority, however, said that, as a matter of broad
constitutional convention, Ottawa needed a "substantial [though not unanimous] measure of provincial consent . . . . " Id. at 905. See P. RussELL, R. DECARY, W. LEDERMAN,
N. LYON, & D. SoeERMAN, THE CouRT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982) for a variety of
perspectives on this judgment.
44. See the essays on Federalism and Constitutional Change in Part II of AND No
ONE CHEERED, supra note 2, for explanations of these positions, and R. SHEPPARD & M.
VALPY, supra note 2, for an examination of the personalities involved.
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necessary in order to appreciate the solution that was eventually
fashioned. 411
The first of these concerns, usually labeled "parliamentary
sovereignty" in Canada, is that judicial supremacy is inconsistent with the ideal of democratic self-rule. The Canadian people
select a party to form a government in parliament based on the
policy views expressed in its platform and the personal capacity
of the party's leadership to carry out this policy. If the electorate
is dissatisfied with the government's performance at the end of
its term, the voters can (and often do) dismiss the government
from office and replace it with another. The ballot box is the
people's ultimate mechanism for controlling the shape of government policies on taxation, spending, defense, and foreign affairs.
In Canada, voting is also how citizens have traditionally influenced "rights" issues such as abortion, capital punishment, and
language.
By contrast, Canadians do not select judges by election. Canadian judges are appointed to tenured positions from which they
can be removed only for personal misbehavior, a category which
does not include the direction of their judicial rulings. This independence, this absence of accountability to the general public, is
at the very heart of the judicial office. Such detachment from
popular passions is evidently desirable in a judge adjudicating
the fate of an individual under an established legal framework-e.g., "Is a defendant actually guilty of murder?" or "Did
a doctor actually perform an illegal abortion?" It is less obvious
that the same institutional distance from the populace is appropriate for someone whose task is to decide what the law will
be-e.g., "Does Canada's current abortion law deny either the
woman or the fetus the right not to be deprived of 'life, liberty
or security ... except in accordance with fundamental principles of justice'?" or "Would restoration of the death penalty be
'cruel and unusual punishment'?"
This populist challenge to the Charter was the most intuitively obvious and widely voiced. This was also the easiest to
meet, since ultimately it misses the point about fundamental
rights. But a satisfactory response will proceed along three different fronts, because the strength of this objection varies markedly with each.
45. In this next Part of the article, I draw on a line of analysis which I earlier developed in Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decisionmaking, 46 CAN. BAR REV. 406 (1968);
Weiler, The Defender of Civil Liberties, Ch. 7 of P. WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT (1974);
and Weiler, Of Judges and Rights, Or Should Canada Have a Constitutional Bill of
Rights?, 1980 DALHOUSIE REV. 205.
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First, an inescapable fact of democratic self-rule in a vast and
complex society is that there are inherent limits to the people's
ability to participate directly. They cannot decide by majority
rule at town meetings what every detail of their legal policy is to
be. Government in modern societies involves an intricate division of labor among many individuals and institutions, in view of
the inherent limits of interest, expertise, and time available to
the citizenry at large to air the issues. 46 Although the positions
at the apex of this government structure are filled by elected
representatives of the people-in Canada, a Prime Minister,
Cabinet, and governing party caucus-the vast majority of government slots are filled by professional appointees. The actions
taken by these officials under the power of their office generate
the greatest share of claims subject to judicial scrutiny under a
constitutional Charter.
An apt illustration is to be found in the administration of
criminal justice. The fundamental challenge of the system is to
find the optimum balance between the need for effective crime
control and the claim to personal liberty. Obviously Parliament
cannot pass general laws which resolve this tension in particular
situations. All the legislature can do is express a mood; for example, it could declare that powers of arrest must be exercised
only on reasonable grounds, taking account of the relevant circumstances. Without a Charter, full authority to make the key
administrative decisions in each specific instance would rest
with officials-police, prosecutors, prison and parole board officers-who operate with little public visibility and who have a
bureaucratic perspective inherently tilted against claims of civil
liberty infringement. Under the Charter, final decisions about
such claims would be made by judges with no institutional commitment to either side and with the benefit of a public hearing
in which each side can present its position. Whatever else one
might say about the appropriate division of responsibility in this
area, giving the authoritative voice to appointed judges instead
of, say, to appointed prosecutors should not raise the spectre of
erosion of Canadian democracy.
Of course, this argument will not suffice where the legislature
has made a clear statement about some important policy issue,
in the criminal justice field or elsewhere. Here, a judicial "last
word" under a constitution would put the judiciary at odds with
the body that is directly accountable to the people. Even then,
one must not leap too quickly to the conclusion that a judicial
46.

See generally

R. DAHL,

AFTER

THE REVOLUTION?

(1970).
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final say is always incompatible with democratic values. After
all, a majority vote in a legislative assembly is not an infallible
litmus test for "democracy": it is a procedural device that we
find is normally the best instrument for securing the ideal of
self-government in a community of political equals. But the
practice of representative democracy implies a structural core
consisting of periodic elections between parties competing for
the vote of a broad-based electorate that has been educated
about the issues through vigorous public commentary, especially
by an uninhibited press. A government in power may be
tempted to pass laws which hamstring the opposition party in an
election, or dilute the integrity of the ballot through malapportionment and gerrymander of constituencies, or muzzle the press
to still criticism of its policies. Judicial power to strike down
measures such as these, to require even elected legislators to adhere to the basic principles of a democratic regime, would seem
to enhance rather than detract from the people's self-rule. 47
Had the domain of the new Charter been confined to this core
of so-called "democratic rights," there would have been little opposition to it in Canada. Popular recognition of the primacy of
these rights is reflected, in fact, in the favored legal status that
they were granted in the final version of the Charter. 48 The great
majority of rights guaranteed by the Charter, those labeled in
the document as fundamental, egalitarian, legal, or language
rights, cannot, however, be characterized as simply guaranteeing
the integrity of democratic procedures. Canadians were well
aware that most of the controversial rights jurisprudence in the
United States-recent decisions about pornography, school
prayer, busing, the death penalty, and abortion and earlier decisions about labor and social legislation-arose from constitutional provisions dealing with substantive rights rather than
democratic procedures. Thus it was to this American experience
that opponents of the Charter appealed in claiming that the
principles of democracy were at odds with a constitutional document that permitted the value judgments of an oligarchic court
to prevail over an elected legislature responsible to the strong
views of the majority.
Even that objection holds only if one supposes democratic
government to mean that whatever policy the majority of the
community wants, it is entitled to have, irrespective of the bur47. This is the thesis of J. ELY, supra note 1, especially Ch. 5, Clearing the Channels
of Political Change.
48. See infra text accompanying note 99.
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den this imposes on a dissenting minority. For my own part, I
have always thought that democracy is an ideal, a regime deserving of support if, and only if, it incorporates some restraints on
the legitimate scope of majority will, limitations on government
power that flow from a decent respect for the fundamental
rights of the individual. To put it another way, if one wants to
justify, rather than simply describe, the democratic as contrasted to the authoritarian form of government, one has to appeal to a notion of the equal worth of each individual, which
implies an equal right to political participation. But that same
premise will also imply a right to governmental respect for that
individual's freedom of conscience, to protection against cruel
and degrading punishment, and so on. Thus, when one unravels
the case for democratic government, it supports not the pure
majoritarian form, but rather a regime limited by a number of
constituent moral principles.
This being the case, it is not implausible to spell out these
limits in a document designed to be enforced by the courts. It is
true that the experience of Canada (and also of the United
Kindgom) under a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty testifies to the possibility of relying on the unwritten self-restraint of
the political branch of the government to preserve individual
rights. 49 Canadian history, however, is also marred by unfortunate illustrations of the tendency of overzealous legislatures,
spurred on by popular passions, to flout unwritten principles of
fairness-especially when they are advanced on behalf of an unpopular minority. 50 It may be asking too much of human nature
to expect the political branch always to police itself and its majority supporters against this temptation. An independent judiciary is the natural candidate to play that role.
Let me add this comparative note. Judicial review seems to fit
more comfortably within a congressional system of government,
designed to distribute power among separate, independent
branches. I suspect that it may be even more necessary in modern parliamentary government, with its concentration of power
in a single office. 51
The Canadian parliamentary system exhibits these two important features: first, strict party discipline in the House of Commons to avoid nonconfidence votes which would dislodge the
49. Recall the death penalty issue discussed supra note 6.
50. See T. BERGER, supra note 11.
51. For a similar view, see E. FRIEDENBERG, supra note 4, especially Ch. 4, Some
Structural Obstacles to Liberty under the Canadian System of Government (an expatriate American critically examining the pre-Charter state of civil liberties in Canada).
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government and precipitate an election, and, second, the growth
of prime ministerial authority over his cabinet and his caucus,
which has gradually eroded independent centers of power inside
Ottawa. ~2 That fusion of governmental power is supposed to give
the leader and his cabinet the political resources to achieve serious policy innovation, to pursue a sustained and coherent program, and to answer to the electorate for the results. Many observers in the United States look fondly at that form of
government, especially in comparison with the political entrepreneurship which is endemic to the American congressional
system, with its numerous wielders of power, each of whom is a
target for special interest lobbies and all of whom are engaged in
continual dealing and logrolling.
But while parliamentary government may look like a more responsible, even a more democratic, instrument when its resources are used for benign purposes, it can be a lot less attractive in actual operation. A governing party with a bare majority
in a Canadian legislature can use party discipline and closure to
impose its favored policies, even though our electoral system
regularly produces governments that are formed exclusively by a
party that has polled considerably less than the majority of
votes. As the Parti Quebecois demonstrated, with the leverage of
parlimentary power even such a "plurality" government can
swiftly initiate a fundamental transformation in society through
an instrument such as the Charter of the French Language,
which was enacted almost untouched, in spite of the intense opposition of a sizeable English-speaking minority in Quebec.~3
In the United States, on the other hand, the congressional
model has historically been celebrated as a barrier to this kind
of majority tyranny. There are many independent centers of
power in Washington able to deflect the current will of the majority by voicing the intense interest of minority groups who
would be adversely affected. Thus any policy that succeeds in
navigating its way past all these shoals is highly likely to enjoy
widespread support. ~4 Judicial review in the United States is
simply another factor in that elaborate system of checks and
balances; in the recent activist era of judicial review, it has acted
as a lever, giving protection to certain minorities who have not
fared so well with the elected branches of American government.
Hockin ed. 1977). See also R.
(1977).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
54. See J. CuoPER, supra note 1, at 4-47.
52.

See the essays in

APEX OF POWER (T.

PRIME MINISTER IN CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
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Few such institutional obstacles and protections are available in
Canada. That is why I believe, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that the case for external judicial review of the political
process is stronger m the context of a parliamentary
government. 1111
B.

The Wisdom of Judge-made Rights

To argue that judicial authority over fundamental rights is legitimate, as I have done here, is not to establish that it is desirable. To illustrate the difference, consider the question whether
to entrench in the constitution the right to economic justice-to
a reasonable minimum income or perhaps even to a fair distribution of wealth. It would not be difficult to make a stronger case
for such a right than for many rights currently guaranteed under
American constitutional law, for example, the emerging right of
"intimate association." 116 Indeed, more equitable distribution of
economic resources and assurance of a minimum standard of living is arguably as essential to realization of democratic self-rule
as is much of what is categorized as "freedom of speech. " 57 Yet
no mention of these economic rights appears in the Charter, 118
notwithstanding the fact that during his incarnation as a constitutional law professor, Trudeau promoted the case for recognizing these rights. 119
.,.
The reason for the omission was simply that, however attrac55. Of course, this comparative judgment about the repressive potential of the congressional and parliamentary models of governments holds only ceteris paribus. A particular country may be lucky enough in its social equilibrium that it can be more protective of fundamental rights even with a parliamentary system. See the discussion about
the death penalty in Canada, supra note 6.
56. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980).
57. See R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982); C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS
AND MARKETS (1977); see also Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 249-257 (1981).
58. Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, actually does write in one aspect of
economic justice, the principle of equalization of the revenues available to different provincial governments for the provision of public services. The inclusion of this principle in
the Charter represents one of the proud achievements of postwar Canadian federalism.
See Davenport, The Constitution and the Sharing of Wealth in Canada, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 109 (1982). Nevertheless, the constitutional drafters were
careful not to entrench any formula that would create a legal entitlement in this area.
The difficulties that Canadian governments had experienced in the 1970's in implementing the principle of intergovernmental equality convinced them that the authority to
adjust the equalization scheme to a changing economic universe had to be left with the
political rather than judicial branches of government.
59. See Trudeau, Economic Rights, 8 McGILL L.J. 121 (1961).
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tive the concept of economic equality might seem in the abstract, to translate that right into more specific terms and then
to enforce it in the real world, where it would inevitably conflict
with other rights and freedoms, would be a difficult and contentious undertaking. Certainly that task would require not mere
technical legal expertise, but broad philosophical vision and fine
social sensitivity. Yet essentially the same judgment would be
true for most of the rights included in the proposed Charter.
Thus, the real dilemma facing Canadians was not whether our
parliamentary democracy should honor basic human rights, but
whether wiser judgments about the meaning of our political morality would emerge if final say on the subject were given to the
courts.
Here, the American experience was most enlightening. The
literature on judicial review is strongly in accord that American
courts, under the rubric of constitutional law, are articulating
the fundamental moral principles of the society; as one scholar
observed, the judge "searches for what is true, right or just."60 A
few commentators lament this departure from fidelity to the intention of the original constitution's writers; 61 others attempt to
confine the judicial quest to "participational" values, to enhancing the quality of representative democracy. 62 But most modern
constitutional scholars applaud this judicial role, precisely because they believe courts are more competent at this task than
are legislatures. 63
Courts do have certain institutional advantages that make this
claim plausible. Whereas legislators tend to fob off troublesome
moral issues, feeling that they can only lose votes by taking a
stand on them, judges are obliged to respond to each claim on
its legal merits, no matter how unpopular its exponent may be. 64
Nor is it enough for the judges just to assert a bare preference
for a particular result: the court must also provide a reasoned
justification for its decision, extending to the instant case the
benefit of principles that underlie analogous cases. 65 Because
they are not compelled by electoral self-preservation simply to
reflect existing community moral values and prejudices, judges
60. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979).
61. Especially Raoul Berger. See R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 363-72.
62. This is the thesis of J. ELY, supra note 1.
63. Two of the best recent statements of this viewpoint are Dworkin, supra note 29,
and Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1979).
64. See Fiss, supra note 60, at 12-14.
65. See C. BLACK, supra note 1.
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are free to move the law forward to a more enlightened viewpoint on a controversial subject. They can stake out a position
that the people may well accept once they see it spelled out, but
that an electorally accountable body would have been loathe to
risk proposing in the face of current attitudes. 66 As Ronald
Dworkin once put it, judicial review transfers fundamental right
issues "from the battleground of power politics to the forum of
[moral and legal] principle." 67
The contrast between the way that Canadian law and American law treat illegally obtained evidence vividly illustrates the
force of that claim. Two decades ago the United States Supreme
Court fashioned the doctrine that evidence obtained as a result
of unconstitutional police investigation is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. 68 The Canadian Supreme Court refused to
adopt the same doctrine under our statutory Bill of Rights. 69
Even in the United States there is a vigorous debate about this
evidentiary rule 70 that focuses on whether the rule effectively deters illegal police action out in the field-the primary justification for the doctrine in the eyes of several Supreme Court
justices.
However that argument turns out, from the Canadian perspective, a major virtue of the American rule is the light that it
has thrown on the entire array of police and prosecutorial practices. Abuse of power in this area is no longer swept under the
political rug. With a rule excluding illegally obtained evidence,
United States courts provide both an incentive and a forum for
the legal profession to examine such issues as "stop and frisk" or
border searches, to weigh the merits of arguments for crime control and due process, and then to develop a principled solution
for each situation. No such dialogue has taken place in Canada,
not even under the old Bill of Rights, through which the Canadian Supreme Court, in effect, passed the buck back to Parliament, a body institutionally incapable of fashioning a satisfacSee M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 111-113.
Dworkin, supra note 29, at 518.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
See Hogan v. The Queen, 48 D.L.R.3d 427 (Can. 1975).
See the debate between Y. Kamisar and M. Wilkey in Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 62 JuDICATURE 67 (1978); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The
Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than 'An Empty Blessing', 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62
JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let
Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351 (1979). See also Amsterdam,
Perspectives on The Fourth Amendme,;t, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 429-39 (1974); Oaks,
Studying the Exlusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665 (1970).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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tory jurisprudence for these ticklish but low-visibility issues.
Now that the Charter provides such an exclusionary rule, 71 a
systematic and authoritative appraisal of the Canadian criminal
justice system is getting underway.
While the advantages of the judicial forum supported a major
role for Canadian courts on rights issues, they did not necessarily dictate that our judges have the last word, as contemplated
by the original Charter Resolution. Whatever the fancy claims
legal scholars make for judicial reflection about issues of high
moral principle, many Canadians had serious qualms about assigning final authority on such issues to a forum reserved exclusively for lawyers.
One concern was with the fact-finding technique employed by
lawyers, the presentation of oral testimony under oath, subject
to cross-examination by opposing counsel. While this technique
constitutes a powerful instrument for getting at the adjudicative
facts to which a legal rule will be applied-who did what to
whom ?-it is less than ideal for developing policy facts, those
patterns and ambiguities in social life relevant to judgments
about what the legal rules should be. 72 Does the death penalty
actually reduce the homicide rate to the extent that it should
not be labeled wantonly cruel punishment? 73 Does mandatory
busing to integrate schools improve the educational achievement
of black children enough to declare it constitutionally required
for equal educational opportunity? 74 My own experience has
convinced me that the legislative or administrative process, certainly by comparison with the current Canadian judicial process,
offers the best access to the ingredients of sophisticated policy
analysis. 75 And for the many issues on which the social sciences
offer little help, legislators can rely on a broader range of per71. The original version of the Charter precluded such a remedy. In line with the
general trend in the Joint Parliamentary Committee to expand the force of the Charter,
see supra note 7, however, a new§ 24 provided a broad remedial authority for the courts
that included the power to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence. See P. HOGG,
supra note 2, at 66-68. Still such exclusion is not automatic: it should occur only when
introduction of the evidence would "bring the administration of justice into disrepute."
Constitution Act, 1982, § 24(2). This limitation added another sensitive moral judgment
to the responsibilities of Canadian courts under the Charter.
72. The best treatment of this issue is D. HOROWITZ, THE CouRTS AND Soc1AL Poucv
(1977). A provocative treatment in the same vein, but in the context of judicial control of
administrative agencies, is J. MASHAW, BuREACRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
73. J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 178-194 (2nd ed. 1983).
74. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69 (1983).
75. See Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on The Policy-Making Role of
Canadian Courts, 25 CAN. Pue. Ao. 1 (1982).
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sonal experience and contact with the general public in making
commonsense decisions.
I do not mean to overstate the advantages of the political
branch. Only too often elected officials find it safer to ignore
what they learn and simply to vote according to the prejudices
of their constituents. But I do want to underline the occupational vice of courts: in the rarefied atmosphere of their chambers, judges may occasionally spin out the logical implications of
an abstract principle without appreciating how awkwardly the
doctrine fits with real world concerns. 76 Even worse, the defective products of that process become embedded in constitutional
jurisprudence, immune from the normal process of policy experimentation and change.
This shortcoming is characteristic of the performance of the
Canadian judiciary in its traditional constitutional role as umpire of Canadian federalism. 77 Canadian courts gave much the
same treatment to our New Deal era legislation as did the
United States Supreme Court, but Canadian judges never made
the "switch in time that saved nine." Canadian law still contains
much of what the courts called the "watertight compartment"
theory of our federal system, which they fashioned early in the
twentieth century. Only an ingenious system of intergovernmental negotiations enabled the Canadian political process to escape
that constitutional straitjacket and to deal effectively with the
problems of the postwar era. Yet in the 1970's, when such federal-provincial diplomacy proved less successful and the courts
reemerged as major actors within Canadian federalism, the old
doctrines were often woodenly applied with little regard for contemporary socioeconomic facts and needs. Without digressing to
substantiate these assertions, I can say that the performance of
the Supreme Court of Canada in the federalism arena did not,
for many of our governmental leaders, inspire confidence in the
Court's competence to fulfill its new role as the oracle of our
fundamental rights.
The beginning of wisdom in comparative constitutionalism
76. Growing appreciation of this tendency was a major theme in the evolving position
of Alexander Bickel, from his A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) to A.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1969) and finally to A. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
77. I have written in detail about this in Weiler, The Supreme Court and The Law of
Canadian Federalism, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 307 (1973) and have speculated about the
Court's role in The Umpire of Canadian Federalism, ch. 6 of my book IN THE LAST
RESORT (1974). At the moment, I am writing a book titled THE LASKIN COURT AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM: 1974-84. I draw on all these sources for the observations made in this
paragraph.
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consists in the realization that the appropriate division of labor
between legislature and judiciary must, to a large extent, be indigenous to each country and must depend on that nation's experience with and faith in the operation of each branch. Americans have more confidence in the wisdom of their judges, and
less in their state legislatures, than do Canadians. Over the last
quarter century the American judiciary has grown increasingly
sophisticated in its approach to legal issues, a development necessary in view of the greater responsibilities that have been entrusted to it. But even in the United States I sense that courts
tend to the characteristic weakness I noted earlier. As illustration, let me contrast the treatment of two election rights issues
to show how differently the political process in Canada has responded to problems for which, in the United States, the Supreme Court has provided a constitutional formula.
In Canada, although we encourage free and vigorous
campaigning by candidates and parties, we have placed strict
limits on the amount of money that may be spent on a campaign, specifically, on the amount of television time that may be
purchased. 78 We do not accept the legal logic of the United
States Supreme Court that the freedom to speak one's mind on
political issues without government censorship implies the freedom to spend as much money as one wants in propagating these
views. 79 Similarly, Canadians believe that each person should
have only one vote; and we periodically realign electoral boundaries to preserve a reasonable range in constituency size. 80 Yet we
do not believe that political equality mandates anything near
mathematical identity among election districts so as to ignore
geographic dispersion within the ridings, natural alignments
among voters and legislators concentrated in large urban areas,
and so on. 81 Political scientists tell us that it is impossible to
78. There is a comprehensive analysis of the nature and operation of the Canadian
system of campaign financing in F. SEIDLE & K. PALTIEL, Party Finance, The Election
Expenses Act, and Campaign Spending in 1979 and 1980, in CANADA AT THE POLLS,
1979 AND 1980, at 226 (H. Penninan ed. 1981).
79. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For the effects of Buckley, see Cox,
Constitutional Issues: The Regulation of the Financing of Election Campaigns, 31
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395 (1982); Drew, Politics and Money: Part I, NEW YORKER, Dec. 6,
1982, at 54; Drew, Politics and Money: Part II, NEW YORKER, Dec. 13, 1982, at 57.
80. See Beaudoin, The Democratic Rights, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS, supra note 37, at 213, 229-230.
81. The United States Supreme Court has adopted this interpretation of its Constitution, at least for congressional districts. See Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983);
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). For
a sustained critique of the intellectual underpinning of this conclusion, see W. ELLIOTT,
THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974). For an earlier discussion of the contrary Ca-
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achieve the ideal of an equal value for each person's vote in a
system of single-member constituencies with elections conducted
on a first-past-the-post model. 82 Without expounding here on
why I prefer the Canadian approach to these issues, these and
other examples 83 satisfy me that the pragmatic balance that is
likely to emerge from the political process is often as sensitive to
the values underlying fundamental rights as is the rigorous elaboration of constitutional principles by a court.
But this is not to recant on the positive case made above for
constitutional rights. The availability of a judicial forum in the
United States allows issues of moral and political principle-affirmative action, for example-to be aired, producing a
sophisticated national dialogue about them. Perhaps such an
uninhibited debate is not always an unmixed blessing. The controversy over abortion, for instance, was much more muted in
Canada than in the United States. One reason this was so is that
in the late 1960's the Canadian Parliament expanded the
grounds for legal abortion to include instances where the health
of the mother was in danger. Administration of the law was delegated to hospital committees composed of doctors. In most parts
of Canada, doctors have brought about de facto abortion on demand by expanding the concept of "health," though that evolution has taken place sub rosa and, thus, in a rather erratic and
nadian position, see Caron, Un Homme, Un Vote, 2 THEMIS 209 (1967).
82. Although pure proportional representation might be taken to embody the ideal of
an equal value for each person's vote, it poses serious dangers to the stability and performance of the political regime itself. For an extended treatment of the issue of partial
proportional representation which has emerged as the constitutional concern with the
electoral system in Canada, see W. IRVINE, DOES CANADA NEED A NEW ELECTORAL SvsTEM? (1979).
83. For instance, the claim of French-Catholics to publicly supported "separate but
equal" schools for their children, which I treated earlier under its language aspect, see
supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text, is part of a broader Canadian program of full
public funding of denominational schools (with separate school boards and tax rates).
Those interested in a comparative treatment of this first amendment issue could journey
just north of the border and find a country that not only has none of the "entanglement"
of church and state, which has so exercised the United States Supreme Court, but also
has a flourishing public school system as well. See Hudon, Church, State, and Education
in Canada and the United States: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law, 21 LES
CAHIERS DE DROIT 461 (1980).
.
It would also be interesting to compare the operation of the American solution to the
problem of freedom of the press and libel of public figures, a narrow malice-based liability rule with potential million dollar awards, contingency fees for plaintiff's counsel, and
no costs for successful defendants, with the Canadian solution, a broad common law doctrine of strict liability with lower awards (five figures or less), rare contingent fees, and
costs assessed against the losing plaintiff. For a somewhat dated look at the two systems,
see Weiler, Defamation, Enterprise Liability and Freedom of Speech, 17 U. TORONTO
L.J. 278 (1967).

FALL

Canadian Rights and Judges

1984]

77

inequitable fashion. 84 But at the same time, because abortions
are all performed for reasons of "health" in order to be legal,
they are automatically paid for by the national health insurance
scheme. Now this rather ramshackle product of the process of
"muddling through" in the political arena is about to be tested
in the forum of high legal principle by constitutioµal challenges
to the current regime from both the pro-choice and the pro-life
ends of the spectrum. Perhaps in a few years Canadians will look
back fondly upon our age of innocence in the pre-Charter days! 811
I doubt that this will be the case. Canadian democracy will
benefit from the constitutional stimulus provided by the Charter
to sustained reflection about moral restraints upon majority
rule. Putting fundamental rights in the constitution was a necessary, though not sufficient, means to that end. At the same time,
there was reason to be uneasy about taking the fateful step that
would give Canadian judges and lawyers-not to mention law
professors-the nearly exclusive voice in that dialogue. For those
who recognized that there were two sides to the problem, the
proposed Charter posed a genuine dilemma. Could we devise a
satisfactory solution to the problem of judges and rights in our
democracy? From here, my account will unavoidably become
more personal.
IV.

A.

SOLVING THE DILEMMA

Creating a New Kind of Court

One possibly fruitful avenue might have been to approach the
dilemma from the "judge" side of the ledger. After all, the powerful new role that Canadian courts were being given in our public life should certainly have merited thorough scrutiny of the
nature and operation of the judicial process to ensure that it
would be up to the challenge. In fact, considerable attention was
paid to the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the constitu84. For criticism of the nature and administration of current abortion Jaw of Canada,
see REPORT OF THE BADGLEY COMMITTEE ON THE ABORTION LAW (1977); Dickens, The
Morgentaler Case: Criminal Process and Abortion Law, 14 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 229
(1975); Harris & Tupper, A Study of Therapeutic Abortion Committees in British Columbia, 11 U. BRIT. CoLUM. L. REv. 81 (1977).
85. The heated post-Charter debate about abortion in Canada is evidenced by the
fact that the litigation has produced two cover story reports. See Riley, The Agony Over
Abortion, MACLEAN'S, July 25, 1983, at 32; Special Report: Abortion, MACLEAN'S, Nov.
19, 1984, at 44.
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tional debates of the 1970's. 88 A valuable by-product of this debate was that the notion of a specialized constitutional tribunal,
on the European model, was placed on the Canadian agenda.
This notion impliedly rejected the nineteenth-century view that
the constitution is merely an ordinary law, to be construed and
applied by the ordinary courts of the land. 87
If one were to begin designing a new tribunal whose exclusive
responsibility would be interpreting the constitution, novel and
intriguing possibilities might emerge about the mode and terms
of appointment of its members and about the manner in which
the body would proceed to hear and resolve issues. 88 More pertinent to my inquiry here, one might well want to appoint some
nonlawyers to this "court," thus insuring that the body with ultimate authority over fundamental questions of political morality would include members with the perspective of other disciplines and the experience of other vocations.
In the United States, contemporary commentary on modern
constitutional jurisprudence starts from the premises that the
Supreme Court's role is to expound the nation's fundamental
values, 89 that the Court is engaged in a "search for what is true,
right, or just," 0O and even that it is a font of "moral prophecy."01
How, then, could anyone seriously argue that this function must
be performed exclusively by lawyers? 02 Surely one would want to
86. The debate, however, focused on the Court's existing constitutional role as umpire of Canadian federalism. The best review of the numerous proposals and arguments
in that debate is MacPherson, The Potential Implications of Constitutional Reform for
the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1 CANADA AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 225 (S. Beck &
I. Bernier ed. 1983).
87. See generally M. CAPPELLE'ITI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
(1971). Of course, in the United States that simplistic view has long been rejected. Recently, there have been a number of proposals to pare away much of the general appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in order to permit the Court to focus its energies
on its burdensome constitutional workload. See Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium
of Proposals to Reduce the Work Load of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307
(1983).
88. An especially illuminating study of the range of options which have proved viable
in different countries is M. SHAPIRO, COURTS (1981).
89. See supra note 63; see also C. BLACK, supra note l; Richards, Moral Philosophy
and the Search for Fundamental Values in Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319
(1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486
(1982).
90. Fiss, supra note 60.
91. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 98.
92. Though, for the reasons stated earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 60-71, I
think one would want a tribunal with the characteristics of a "court": independence,
openness, obligation to come to grips with the issue on its merits, and a commitment to
the method of principled reasoning.
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include voices from other quarters in this "interpretive community."93 For example, rather than rely on William Brennan's version of the egalitarian liberalism of John Rawls, why not include
Rawls himself? 0 " Appointing a sophisticated journalist such as
George Will along with a William Rehnquist would certainly add
breadth and depth to a constitutional tribunal; so would including a social scientist such as Kenneth Clark along with a
Thurgood Marshall.
Attractive as this idea may be, when I suggested it several
ye.ars ago in a public lecture in Vancouver, 95 it proved to be a
definite nonstarter in Canada. The Canadian public clings to the
illusion that constitutional adjudication is entirely a legal skill,
and our lawyers-including our lawyer-politicians-are more
than happy to foster that view and thereby protect their turf.

B.

Creating a New Kind of Right

If we cannot change the nature of the court so as to broaden
the dialogue about fundamental rights, why not change the nature of the rights themselves, so as to foster a more fruitful exchange between courts and legislatures? The first step in doing
so is to enshrine fundamental rights in the constitution rather
than leave them as part of ordinary statutory or common law.
This will give these rights a legal imprimatur as a signal to our
judges that they are to be taken seriously (as they were not
under the old Canadian Bill of Rights). At the same time,
though, an escape valve permitting the elected legislature to enact a statute that will prevail notwithstanding the Charter of
Rights-a statute that explicitly states that it was enacted on
such terms-should be incorporated into the Charter itself,
modifying the legal force of the rights therein contained.
I launched this notion in another public lecture, this time in
93. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
94. Ronald Dworkin made one of the more provocative observations in the debate
about constitutional adjudication of the 1970's when he maintained that the constitutional lawyer of the future would have to be well-versed in first-rate moral philosophy, as
exemplified by J. Rawls' A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 149.
This brings to mind the famous fantasy of Learned Hand: "Hand was in heaven and in
the company of a group of intellectual heavyweights who were talking with God about
large political-moral issues. And the Lord said: 'Shut up, Plato! I want to hear what
Hand has to say!'" Wellington, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REv. 326, 334 n.10 (1983).
95. This was the Ladner Lecture at the University of British Columbia. See P. WEILER, WHAT THE SUPREME COURT IS DOING TO THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM MAY Do TO THE COURT (1980).
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Halifax, at the other end of the country. 96 Initially it attracted
as little attention and support as my proposal for nonlawyer
judges. But two years later, when the idea was presented to
some participants in the provincial-federal negotiations on the
eve of the final conference in November 1981, it appeared to be
a tolerable compromise to the deadlock over the Charter. The
legislative override-or non obstante formula, as it is dubbed in
legal parlance-found its way into the constitution as the distinctive Canadian solution to the problem of judges and rights_in
a democracy. 97
As I noted at the outset, most Canadians, then and now, see
non obstante as the product of political expediency-a necessary
evil, perhaps, but not a formula to be proud of. Obviously, I take
quite a different view: for Canada at least, this was an intrinsically sound solution to the dilemma of rights and courts. Now
that I have made full disclosure of my personal involvement and
inclination, I shall spell out the arguments for and against the
non obstante formula. 98
96. This was the Killam Lecture at the University of Dalhousie. See Weiler, Of
Judges and Rights, Or Should Canada Have a Constitutional Bill of Rights?, 1980 DALHOUSIE REV. 205.
97. I do not mean to imply that the non obstante idea was brand-new. Actually, it
had been around in Canadian law for about two decades as a feature of the old Bill of
Rights (§ 2). But this clause was inserted in the statutory Bill as a limitation on Parliament in the "manner and form" through which it could override these protected rights in
the face of the long-standing maxim that Parliament could not legally limit its future
action. See W. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 3, at 87-116. By the 1970's, the debate had
moved on to the question of whether Canadian legislatures should be restrained by an
explicitly constitutional document, and both sides tacitly assumed that the only choice
was between full entrenchment or none. In 1979, when I ventured to ask whether Canada
should have a constitutional Bill of Rights, see supra note 96, it seemed to me that this
was a false dichotomy: instead there was a broader menu of options from which we could
choose. I proposed that Canadians employ the non obstante device as an outlet for Parliamentary action under an otherwise constitutionally entrenched Charter. See infra note
99 (describing a procedural wrinkle I added to the non obstante device). So far as I
know, this was the only written brief for such a solution to our constitutional deadlock.
For a time this argument remained in academic obscurity. On September 28, 1981,
however, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its decision in Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1981), see supra note 43, a
complex ruling which put considerable pressure on both sides to return to the bargaining
table for •me final attempt at settlement. That set a number of governments looking for
alternatives to those already on the table. In the next several weeks I spoke personally to
senior public officials in British Columbia and Ottawa and just before the Conference to
Premier Davis of Ontario. (Sometime earlier I had discussed the paper at length with
Premier Blakeney of Saskatchewan.) Equipped with this basic familiarity with the non
obstante notion within Canadian law, and with one extended scholarly defense of its
virtues in the constitutional context, the protagonists reached for this formula for their
Accord in the early hours of the -morning of November 3, 1981.
98. Though I would not rest my defense on this point, one can make a particularly
strong case for the non obstante clause as a short-term, transitional feature of a Char-
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First, it appears evident that even with the non obstante provisions, the new Charter will succeed in large part in securing
the protection of fundamental rights that Canadians sought
through constitutional entrenchment. The Charter contains a
mandate to Canadian judges to restrain all infringements of
these rights by executive officials and tribunals, whose intrusions
are usually cloaked in broad legal language rather than specific
legislative directives.
Furthermore, elected legislatures are now precluded from
passing laws that inadvertently or obliquely infringe on constitutional values. Indeed, even if Parliament were deliberately and
clearly to express its will to limit a fundamental right, it could
not do so under the Charter simply by stating its intention to do
so. To make such a law prevail, the government would have to
use a formula designed to draw the proposal to the attention of
the opposition, the press, and the general public. In a society
sufficiently enamored of fundamental rights to enshrine them in
ter. Introducing constitutional rights into Canada posed a serious problem precisely because we live right next door to the United States. Judicial review has been a feature of
American law for nearly 200 years. The judicial process in the United States has grown
highly sophisticated in handling these questions. American lawyers and judges have been
able to learn by doing the skill of constitutional adjudication. Typically, the easier claims
come first. The process of resolving them produces an intellectual apparatus which generates new and harder problems, but also provides directions on how to solve them. At
any one time, then, there will be something of an equilibrium in the character of the
questions posed and the capacity of the legal culture to grapple with them.
That legal learning curve would not have been available in Canada. The proposed
Charter contained essentially the same rights, and used much the same language, as the
United States Constitution. There were few domestic precedents or analyses, however,
that would be helpful in interpreting the new provisions. Commentaries and Annotations
were quickly published which included references to the major American cases, often the
most recent and controversial decisions. Thus, the accidents of litigation were just as
likely to present to Canadian courts the hard cases first, because the Canadian lawyer
would look for and be able to find an American precedent to use as a legal lever for his
own case.
In that setting, one concern was that Canadian courts might jump in and do the wrong
thing because they have not had to traverse each step and test out the logic of the arguments on each side of the question. The judges might apply aspects of American jurisprudence inconsistent with the Canadian experience. The non obstante provision allows
for legislative corrections of these judicial bloopers while the courts are feeling their way.
The more likely prospect, though, is that the Canadian courts, not seeing a safe legal
bridge to a solution to these hard cases, would simply refuse to leap into the problem
area at all. The judges would give the provisions of the Charter the same kind of narrow,
crabbed construction that the Supr~me Court had given to the old Bill of Rights. One
must remember that although the authors of the Charter may have intended activist
judicial review, their intent would neither guarantee nor even justify that the courts
would comply. To my mind, a major virtue of the non obstante provision was that it
could elicit more vigorous judicial scrutiny of a broad range of civil rights issues, because
it would give our judges a sense of security from the presence of a legislative safety net
beneath them.
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its constitution, invocation of the non obstante phrase is guaranteed to produce a lot of political flak. A government would risk
taking such a step only if it were certain. of widespread public
backing for its position on the matter in question. Thus, in spite
of this legal escape hatch, Canadian politicians and commentators concede almost unanimously that the rights contained in
the Charter enjoy a greatly enhanced status by comparison with
those that are not.
Was it not dangerous, though, not to take the final legal step
and fully guarantee these rights against an oppressive government tempted on occasion to deny them? To some extent this
was done. As insurance against the remote possibility of a government's attempting to perpetuate itself in power by denying
basic rights of participation, the core of "democratic"
rights-the rights to vote and run for an elected parliament
which is required to meet at least once a year and to face the
people for reelection at least every five years-were fully entrenched in the Constitution. But the "fundamental" right of
free speech, the "legal" right to be free of arbitrary arrest, and
the "egalitarian" right to protection against discrimination were
each made subject to legislative restriction enacted in the proper
manner. While Canadian judges had the initial authority to determine whether a particular law was a "reasonable limit [of a
right] . . . demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society," Canadian legislators were given the final say if they disagreed with the courts with enough conviction to take the political risks of challenging the symbolic force of the popular
Charter. 99
Some may balk at the prospect of entrusting the legislature
with even such a carefully circumscribed authority. After all, the
very reason for a constitutional Charter was our desire to protect
the fundamental rights of an unpopular individual or a dissident
minority against popular emotion and prejudice expressed
through a legislature responsive to the majority. Only constitu99. In my original Article, I suggested an additional buffer. To trump a Supreme
Court decision, a legislature would first have to enact the law with a non obstante clause.
An election must then take place (though the election need not have been called on this
issue), after which the legislature must reenact the law for it to become effective.
This "sober second thought" procedure would give the people ample time and opportunity to decide whether they preferred the views of their judges or their legislators. In
the actual Charter version, a different procedural device was used: a law enacted with a
non obstante clause becomes valid at once, but to remain effective it has to be reenacted
every five years with that same formula. This "sunset" procedure gives the people their
say after the fact but requires the legislature, the electorate, and also, one hopes, the
judges to think the problem through again and again.
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tional entrenchment in the strong sense is up to that task.
In one respect, this argument might take us too far. It would
rule out even objectionable constitutional amendments pushed
through by a dominant majority using this vehicle to trample on
the rights of the individual. 100 The immediate rejoinder, of
course, is to require the concurrence of a supermajority for constitutional revisions so that the people will rarely encroach on
the judicial plan. 101 The problem with the argument in this form
is that it assumes the point at issue: it implies that the legislative override rather than the judicial construction is likely to be
wrong on the merits. In those cases where the judiciary has miscarried, to permit popular change only through formal amendment means that a tiny minority 102 could hold the nation in a
constitutional vise from which, as the American people have
found, it might take even a war to break loose.
One cannot choose, then, between formal amendment and legislative override as the preferred method for revising judge-made
constitutional policy simply by a priori reasoning about rights
and democracy. One must make a practical judgment about the
relative competence of two imperfect institutions in the context
100. Indeed, it has been seriously argued that the United States Supreme Court
should ignore a formal amendment which it considered an invidious denial of the moral
principles expressed in the rest of the Constitution. See Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 754-57 (1980). But see Brest, Accommodation of
Majoritarianism and Rights of Human Dignity, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 763-64 (1980).
101. In the United States, both houses of Congress, the President, and three-fourths
of the states must approve a constitutional amendment, and, in two centuries, only four
decisions of the Supreme Court have been overridden in this way. Under the British
North America Act, the concurrence of Ottawa and "substantially" all of the provinces
was conventionally necessary to amend the federal division of authority (Canada's traditional preserve of constitutional review), see supra note 43, and only three reversals of
the judicial construction of Canadian federalism were secured in the first century of its
existence. Under the new Constitution Act, 1982, amendments will require the concurrence of Ottawa and any seven provinces that comprise at least 50% of the population.
This means that either Ontario or Quebec must agree. See generally Dellinger, The
Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, LAW
& CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1982, at 283.
Steep political hurdles as well as technical difficulties face any formal amendment to a
constitution. That procedure is best suited for major revision of general concepts or principles. If there is popular objection to a specific application of an existing provision (e.g.,
due process), it is difficult to draft language which focuses only on this specific issue
without attracting the opposition of those who worry about its implications elsewhere. In
this respect, the legislative override is more of a surgical instrument than is formal
amendment, and thus its use is much easier to entertain. Whether this is good or bad
depends on one's view of the arguments discussed in the text.
102. In the United States, 13 states with as few as nine million people, see C. BLACK,
supra note 1, at 38, and in Canada, four provinces with just over two million people. See
the population of the four smallest Canadian provinces in R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN,
supra note 15, at 352.
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of a particular nation. The premise of the Charter is that the
optimal arrangement for Canada is a new partnership between
court and legislature. Under this approach judges will be on the
front lines; they will possess both the responsibility and the legal
clout necessary to tackle "rights" issues as they regularly arise.
At the same time, however, the Charter reserves for the legislature a final say to be used sparingly in the exceptional case
where the judiciary has gone awry. This institutional division of
labor rests on the assumption that the chief threat to rights in
Canada comes from legislative thoughtlessness about particular
intrusions, a fault that can be cured by thoroughly airing the
issues of principle in a judicial forum. The Charter contemplates
no serious danger of outright legislative oppression; certainly
none sufficient to concede ultimate authority to Canadian judges
and lawyers.
I suspect that this arrangement would not be unthinkable in
the United States (even to people who would vigorously oppose
the use of this power in particular cases, like the proposed
human life bill) if it were translated into a congressional override of the Supreme Court. 103 Any measure that could be navigated through all the branches of the national legislative process, each reflecting a variety of constituencies and points of
view, might well be considered a more sensible approach to the
problem than would a verdict from a bare majority of five on the
Court. 104 But almost all American scholars would have grave
103. See Levinson, The Turn Toward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 567, 575-78 (1983); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1185-89 (1977). In fact, Felix Frankfurter favored this option as a
means to deal with the constitutional crisis of the New Deal. See P. IRONS, THE NEW
DEAL LAWYERS 274-75 (1982).
104. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Congress's existing authority to carve out
exceptions to the jurisdiction of the federal courts implies an analogous power. Some
scholars appeal to this congressional power as the linchpin of their justification of the
Supreme Court's far-reaching authority over American life. Their theory maintains that
by failing to deny the Court the authority to rule on certain issues, the people consent to
the results. See C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 18-19, 37-39, 77-79; M. PERRY, supra note 1,
at 128-35.
Regardless of the legal logic of this position, it does not square with the case I have
been making. My major reason for giving the legislature the final say is not that legislators are electorally accountable to a majority which has the right to have its own way.
Rather, it is that when the legislature is driven to address, deliberately and squarely, an
issue of constitutional policy, the judgment which the legislators make is likely to be
sounder than the contrary view of the judges. From that perspective, the jurisdictional
technique is an even cruder and less suitable instrument than formal amendment. See
Lupu, Constitutional Theory and The Search for the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 579, 609-18 (1983); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Constitu·
tional Limits on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REv. 17, 39-42 (1981). Simply because the Congress is thoroughly persuaded
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qualms about conferring any such power on the state legislatures, both from general disenchantment with the deliberative
capacities of state governments and because of the fear that certain state legislatures would respond to majorities who do not
necessarily adhere to the values spelled out in the national constitution. For many people, reflection on what might have happened after Brown u. Board of Education•or, had Mississippi had
a legislative override on fourteenth amendment issues is sobering enough to discredit the entire notion.
The fact that the prospect of a legislative override did not
evoke comparable disquiet in Canada is a testimonial to the
great difference between the Canadian and American conceptions of federalism. Canadians did not see the non obstante
power as one that could safely be entrusted to the government
in Ottawa, yet not to the governments in Quebec City, Victoria,
or other provincial capitals. Our experience with provincial governments has been different from the United States' experience
with state governments in the last thirty years: provincial governments have much broader responsibilities, and they tend to
institute more progressive policies relative to their state counterparts in the United States. Even if this were not the case, as a
practical political matter the non obstante power had to be
· given to the provinces, because the objections to full entrenchment that had to be dealt with came from the provincial
governments.
The fear persists, however, that a particular province could
abuse this power. Canadian history contains several unhappy examples of local majorities' willingness to use their provincial
governments to invade the rights of minorities, where they
would not likely have been successful with the national government, which responds to a broader, more heterogeneous constituency.106 This, however, does not imply that we should never althat the Court has gone awry on a certain point is no reason why it should silence the
judges in the entire legal area, depriving itself of the federal judicial branch as the instrument for administration of this part of the law and leaving the subject to the vagaries of 50 state courts. Those who believe that Congress, not the Court, should have the
last word on the Bill of Rights, would prefer a non obstante power which allows an
authoritative pronouncement on a specific issue that has bothered Congress. As it has
come to be interpreted, the commerce clause of the United States Constitution appears
to give Congress such a role. See P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 145-48 (2nd ed. 1983).
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. I have already referred to the treatment of the French-Catholics in Manitoba.
While Prime Minister Laurier refused to intervene because of his commitment to the
principle of provincial autonomy, certainly he would not have countenanced such a substantive policy emanating from the national government. Similar blots on Canadian his-
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low the political process of any province to override what it
deems misguided judicial policy. An alternative safeguard would
be to allow the national political branch of government to overturn the provincial exercise of the non obstante power in those
rare cases in which the provincial initiative is egregiously offensive. Serendipitously, that political option is actually available
under the current Canadian Constitution. 107 While it would raise
local hackles, Ottawa should be prepared to scrutinize the use by
provincial legislatures of their non obstante authority and to
disallow any instances of flagrant denial of basic human rights to
"discrete and insular minorities" within their boundaries.
EPILOGUE

For better or for worse, Canada did stumble on this distinctive
constitutional partnership between court and legislature for the
protection of fundamental rights. While its merits are appraised
here from the point of view of constitutional theory, the acid
test will be not logic but experience. How will the rights of
Canadians actually fare under the new Charter? It is much too
tory include the treatment of the Chinese by the province of British Columbia and of the
Jehovah Witnesses by the Province of Quebec. See generally T. BERGER, supra note 11.
Nevertheless, the criminal justice system, a perennial sore spot in states' rights over civil
rights issues in the United States, does not pose a comparable problem in Canada because, under § 91(27) of the British North America Act, the national government has
exclusive law-making authority in relation to criminal law and procedure.
107. Our original highly centralized federal system gave the national government in
Ottawa a general authority under § 90 of the British North America Act to "reserve and
disallow" any provincial law of which it disapproved. Historically, the major use of this
power was to control provincial economic initiatives which conflicted with Ottawa's commercial policies and the influential businesses which benefited from them (e.g., disallowance of Manitoba's railroad legislation in the 19th century and Alberta's "social credit"
response to the depression of the thirties). See J. MALLORY, SOCIAL CREDIT AND THE FED·
ERAL PowER IN CANADA, 8-24, 169-80 (1954). As our federal system matured and provincial governments grew in stature, disallowance of their laws was seen to be illegitimate,
and this federal power has fallen into near desuetude since World War II. See P. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 39, 142-143, 151 (1977).
The power, however, was not forgotten. While historically Ottawa rarely used this
power to protect the fundamental rights of provincial minorities, in 1978 the Trudeau
Government offered to delete the provision from a proposed new Canadian Constitution
if, but only if, the provinces agreed to accept judicial restraints under a constitutionally
entrenched Bill of Rights. See Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1978, § 131(3). That offer
was not taken up. Section 33 of the new Charter of 1982 preserves the ultimate sover•
eignty of provincial legislatures vis-a-vis the courts. This history makes a plausible case
for the revival of the disallowance power in the special context of human rights. In this
context one could not apply the usual criticism that the provinces are kept in a state of
tutelage to the national government, whereas the appropriate source of control over their
policies should be the provincial electorate.
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early to tell. Our lower courts have heard hundreds of Charter
claims in the last year and a half, upholding a significant proportion of them. One of the most intriguing suits brought to date is
a challenge to the testing of the Cruise missile, on the grounds
that this will deprive Canadians of "life, liberty, or security"
without regard to the "principles of fundamental justice." 108
When that litigation produced front page headlines in the fall of
1983, 109 many Canadians realized for the first time what a major
transformation was taking place in our political landscape.
As yet, however, we have not heard from the Supreme Court
of Canada, whose views about the actual force of the new constitution will ultimately carry at least as much weight as did the
views of the government leaders who wrote it. 110 In any event,
108. See Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen, [1983) 1 F.C. 429 (Trial Div.),
rev'd, 3 D.L.R.4th 193 (Fed. Ct. App.), leave to appeal granted, [1983) 2 S.C.R., at x
(Can.).
109. See Ottawa Appeal Ruling on Cruise, The Globe and Mail, Sept. 20, 1983, at 1.
Another notable decison was Re Service Employees' Int'l Union, Local 204, 4
D.L.R.4th 231 (Ont. High Ct. J. Div. Ct. 1983), which held that "freedom of association"
under § (2)(d) of the Constitution Act included the right to join a trade union, to engage
in collective bargaining, and even to strike. In this case the Divisional Court merely
found that the Ontario program to limit compensation increases for Ontario public employees under the Inflation Restraint Act, 1982, did not provide sufficient justification
under § 1 of the Charter for the blanket denial of the right to bargain collectively (and
either to strike or to arbitrate) about noneconomic employment conditions. Some broad
language in the judges' reasoning, however, led a few unions to speculate about challenges to general laws restricting public employees' right to strike, politicians to respond
that they would use their authority under § 33 of the Charter to override any such judicial verdict, and civil liberties lawyers, in turn, to deplore any intrusion upon the judicial
prerogative to define the scope and limits of rights in Canada. See Bayefsky, A Catch In
The Charter That Could Erode Rights, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 19, 1983, at 7.
It is doubtful whether Canadian courts are prepared to second-guess a government's
public sector labor policy in that fashion, see Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale
and Dep't Store Union, Local 580, [1984) 3 W.W.R. 481 (B.C. Ct. App.); Public Serv.
Alliance of Can. v. Government of Can. (Fed. Ct. App. June 26, 1984); but if one did, this
is precisely the kind of situation in which a popularly elected legislature should legitimately be able to use this Charter escape valve (assuming the legislature disagrees with
the Court on the merits of the issue). In my view, this form of political safeguard against
provincial abuse of the non obstante power is much better than a final say for Canadian
judges, which even now some lawyers are trying to implant in § 33 of the Charter. See
Note, 61 CAN. BAR REV. 391 (1983).
110. I should emphasize that neither the words of the document nor the intentions of
its authors can dictate the stand which the judges take about the Constitution, because
these interpretive directions are themselves part of the original materials whose legal
force is at issue. This fundamental jurisprudential stance must ultimately rest on a political theory about why we think certain rights should have a preferred status and why the
courts should have a special role in nurturing them. See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 49397. That is why it is terribly important that Canadians understand the reasons why they
have a Charter, and why it took the specific form that it did, in deciding how they should
exercise their respective responsibilities under the new regime, whether as judge, legislator, lawyer, or citizen. (Since this was written, the Supreme Court has issued its first
major decision indicating that it will read the Charter provisiO!JS in a generous, purposive
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Americans interested in how a different kind of constitutional
formula might work should find Canada a fruitful area for comparative study in the next decade and beyond.
Unfortunately, a black cloud is visible on the Canadian horizon, casting a shadow that I have so far omitted from this rather
sunny account. It developed in the area of the intractable language problem. In negotiating the final terms of the Charter,
Pierre Trudeau adamantly refused to extend the non obstante
provision to minority language rights, especially with regard to
the language of education in the provinces. With his lifelong
dream of harmonious relations between French and English Canada now so close to constitutional fruition, the Prime Minister
would not allow these rights to be exposed to the vagaries of the
political process, especially since he knew that the Parti
Quebecois-newly elected with a solid legislative majority in
Quebec-would be swift in using this power to protect its quite
different views about language policy. 111
Although it was understandable, Trudeau's stance was unfortunate. For one thing, it became the primary reason for the Parti
Quebecois' rejecting the constitutional Accord of November,
1981-the only one of eleven provincial governments to do so.
As Premier Levesque phrased it in the Quebec National Assembly, "no self-respecting Quebec government could ever abandon
the smallest fraction of this absolutely fundamental right to protect the only French island in the English-speaking sea of the
North American continent." 112 Thus, when the Queen finally
brought the Canadian constitution to Canadian shores on April
17, 1982, Ottawa celebrated; in Quebec City, however, the flags
were flown at half-mast. On the heels of this event came the
most highly publicized judgment so far rendered under the
way. See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (Can. Sept. 17, 1984).)
111. Actually, Trudeau did relent to the extent that Quebec was given the power
(under § 59 of the Constitution Act, 1982) to decide when to entrench the right (under §
23(1)(a)) of English-speaking Quebecers to send their children to English schools. This
constitutional right, however, was not of great moment because most of its beneficiaries
already had such a statutory right under the Quebec Charter of the French language.
Nevertheless, Trudeau stubbornly refused to permit the province to use § 33 to override
the new constitutional right of Canadian citizens moving to Quebec to send their children to English schools, which § 23(1)(b) had provided in its grant to the Quebecois of
the corollary right to have French-language education when they moved elsewhere in
Canada. I might add that Trudeau's willingness to concede a provincial veto relating to
freedom of speech and equal protection, and his adoption of the same legal escape hatch
for Ottawa (something the dissenting provinces were not insisting upon as part of the
November 1981 Accord), indicate that the entrenchment of language rights had always
been Trudeau's real constitutional priority.
112. 26 JOURNAL DES DtBATS,4 (Nov. 9, 1981).

FALL

1984]

Canadian Rights and Judges

89

Charter which struck down the crucial "Quebec clause" in the
Charter of the French Language, on the ground that it could not
be "justified in a free and democratic society." 113 All in all, this
was hardly an auspicious debut for a constitutional project originally aimed at strengthening the bond between Quebec and
Canada.
An immediate rejoinder, of course, is that one cannot justify
overriding the fundamental rights of the individual, even in the
pursuit of national unity. That stance ignores the depressing
fate of the rest of the Charter rights in Quebec. Because it was
113. See Quebec Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. v. Attorney-General of Quebec (No.
2), 140 D.L.R.3d 33 (Que. Super. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 1 D.L.R.4th 573 (Que. 1983). The decision in this case will not ease the minds of those who are concerned about the quality of
judicial evaluation of public policy issues under the Charter. The court had before it all
the information available: the parties to the litigation called as expert witnesses a number of prominent scholars in the field. Furthermore, the opinion was written by Chief
Justice Deschenes, who, having delivered a series of key judgments on this issue in the
last decades, is deeply versed in the subject of language rights. Unfortunately, the final
product did not live up to its potential. In a long and elegantly worded judgment, the
Chief Justice spent ten pages summarizing the broad range of demographic, educational,
and other points made by each side. Id. at 79-88. Then he took, literally, just a couple of
sentences to reach his conclusion that Quebec did not really need to limit this language
right in the Canadian Charter because English Canadians moving to Quebec would produce only a negligible influx into English-language schools, just slightly braking the
steady decline in the size of that system. Id. at 89. From that bare assertion, the Chief
Justice moved quickly to strike down this key symbolic feature of the Parti Quebecois'
language policy.
Worse, there was a wealth of material that could have been marshalled in support of
his conclusion. Right now, experts project that the French share of the Quebec population will become possibly as high as 86.5% by the year 2001, and in Montreal as high as
79%. See R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, supra note 15, at 301, Table 8-2. Meanwhile,
the economic handicap of being French is quickly being erased: the earnings advantage
of the unilingual Anglophone male over the unilingual Francophone in Montreal dropped
from 1.93 in 1961 to 1.59 in 1970 to 1.20 in 1977, of the bilingual Anglophone from 1.99
to 1.63 to 1.46, and even of the bilingual Francophone from 1.41 to 1.36 to 1.32. See J.A.
BOULET, LANGUAGE AND EARNINGS IN MONTREAL 23-28 (1980). In Quebec as a whole, the
English-French income differential among male workers dropped from 28% in 1971 to
20% in 1978. See S. ARNOPOULOS & D. CLIFT, supra note 21, at 239, Table 14. It is also
clear from the timing of this data that the new language law had little to do with these
favorable trends (which have continued since then. The English-French differential
among male workers dropped to 14% in Montreal in 1980, to 4% in the rest of Quebec,
and the gap for women has effectively been closed as well. See J.A. BOULET & L. LAVALLEE, L'EVOLUTION DES DISPARITE LINGUISTIQUE DE REVENU DE TRAVAIL AU CANADA DE
1970-1980, at 10, 21 (1983)). Thus Bill 101 could safely be relaxed under the Charter of
Rights without any threat to the integrity of Quebec's overall language policies. My
qualms, then, about the judgment concern not its result but rather the process by which
the Chief Justice got there, particularly because this is one of the best, most sophisticated Charter decisions that I have thus far read. (Since this was written, the Supreme
Court has upheld the Deschenes ruling, see 54 National Reporter 196 (1984), but on a
narrower "interpretivist" ground, see supra text accompanying notes 27-42, which the
Court felt was appropriate for the carefully drafted and detailed wording of the language-of-education provision in the Charter.)
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able to portray the Canadian Charter as merely the latest in a
long series of alien regimes imposed on Quebec by Les Anglais,
the Parti Quebecois found it politically easy to pass a blanket
non obstante provision applicable to all existing Quebec legislation. 114 Since 1982, the Parti Quebecois has included a similar
override in every statute it has enacted, beginning with Bill 63,
an Act dealing with sugar refineries. 116 By taking the initiative
immediately, before the Charter had time to put down roots in
Quebec political life, and by making use of the non obstante
formula a matter of legislative routine, the Parti Quebecois was
able to remove all the political hazard of invoking the formula
for particular laws, thus frustrating the entire scheme of the
Charter. The unfortunate by-product, then, of the battle between Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque about language rights
is that the judicial-legislative dialogue about all other fundamental rights now getting underway in the rest of Canada has
been effectively denied to Quebecers-French and English alike.
Ottawa, unfortunately, has done nothing to repair this
damage. 116
114. Bill 62, An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, was introduced in the
Quebec National Assembly in May 1982, and in June it passed the Assembly and received royal assent. See Scott, Entrenchment By Executive Action: A Partial Solution
To "Legislative Over-Ride," 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1982). This Bill purported to
reenact every law then on the statute books with an added "notwithstanding the Charter" clause. A fair argument can be made that this is legally insufficient, because both
the wording and the spirit of § 33 of the Charter seem to require a specific judgment by
the legislature about each law which it wishes to override. Compare Malartic Hygrade
Gold Mines Ltd. v. The Queen in Right of Quebec, 142 D.L.R.3d 512 (Que. 1983) with
Alliance Des Professeurs du Montreal v. Attorney-General of Quebec, 5 D.L.R.4th 157
(Que. 1983). Nevertheless, even if the judges insist on this hurdle, it will simply add to
the time and paperwork required of a government that is politically determined upon
this result.
115. See Scott, supra note 114, at 310.
116. I argued earlier, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, that a Charter of
Rights is especially necessary within a parliamentary system of government because
strict party discipline creates the risk that the party in power might quickly push
through a massive invasion of fundamental rights without having to overcome the checks
and balances of a congressional system. One could read this argument in support of the
proposition that one should not run the risk of abuse of a non obstante authority within
a parliamentary system, and the recent Quebec experience might seem to confirm that
concern.
In principle, I agree that a non obstante power poses greater problems within the parliamentary model. In practice, though, I believe the risks are quite small in Canada,
because of the political obstacles to overriding a very popular Charter. Quebec is the
exception which proves the rule. The problem there was not the content of the Charter
of Rights, but rather the fact that the Parti Quebecois was able to paint it as an alien
constitutional document imposed on Quebec by les Anglais and that Quebecers were
assured that they could continue to rely on their own provincial Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms.
Be that as it may, my own defense of the non obstante idea assumed that it should not
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Sadly, this contretemps was all unnecessary: if the new language rights had only been left to Quebec to adopt voluntarily or
to reject through the override, it is unlikely that the Parti
Quebecois would have eviscerated the rest of the Charter as it
did. Although such a concession would have denied some
Canadians moving to Quebec the kind of educational choice for
their children that I, for one, think they should have, 117 that situation was not inevitably permanent. The Parti Quebecois government appears now to be in grave political difficulty. Its likely
successor, the Quebec provincial Liberals, will almost certainly
accept this feature of the Charter once elected.
Some observers will conclude from this episode that a government cannot be trusted with the non obstante power. I draw a
be exercisable in normal parliamentary fashion; rather, I would have preferred a "sober
second thought" procedure under which § 33 would have to be invoked twice, before and
after an election. See supra note 99. Instead, the drafters added § 33(3), a "sunset"
feature under which non obstante provisions lapse every 5 years. Because the Parti
Quebecois is now far behind in the political polls, see A Dream Fades in Quebec,
MACLEAN's, Feb. 6, 1984, at 10-11, and the new leader of the front-running Quebec Liberal Party is not opposed to the Charter, even its language provisions, see Lewis, Return
from the Depths, MACLEAN's, Oct. 24, 1983, at 12-13, there is reason to hope that the
Quebec National Assembly will not renew Bill 62 et al in 1987.
11'1. I need not belabor the reasons why individual families want freedom of choice
about the language of education for their children, especially the right to choose English
if they are living in North America. On the other side, exercise of this right by Canadian
citizens poses no practical threat to the future of the French language in Quebec. The
evidence in Quebec Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. v. Attorney-General of Quebec (No.
2), 140 D.L.R.3d 33 (Que. Super. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 1 D.L.R.4th 573 (Que. 1983), see supra
note 113, indicated that without the benefit of the "Canada clause" in the Charter, the
English language school population in Quebec would range from 4.8 to 9.4 % of the total
by 2001, while even with that institutional support, the range would be only 9.4 to
12.9%. See R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, supra note 15, at 81. That roughly four percent difference in the level towards which the English school population will be declining
in the next two decades could hardly be said to be of major concern in the province's
language policy.
Nor could one assert that this is really a matter of principle to the effect that if a
family moved to French-speaking Quebec, it should expect that its children would go to
the French public schools (just as they would in France). Actually, the Parti Quebecois
has always been prepared to grant freedom of access to its English schools to Canadians
moving from other provinces but has preferred to use this as a bargaining chip to force
the provision of comparable facilities for Quebecois who move to these other provinces.
See Magnet, supra note 25, at 200-01. Now the Charter settles that reciprocity issue by
requiring all Canadian provinces to provide minority language education in either
French or English where the number of children warrant it. See Constitution Act, 1982,
§ 23(3). Moreover, while the Supreme Court of Canada decision in the appeal of Quebec
Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. was pending, the Parti Quebecois amended its own language laws to provide such access as a matter of statutory, if not constitutional, right.
See Wilson-Smith, Levesque's Unfulfilled Promises, MACLEAN's, Nov. 28, 1983, at 34-35.
All in all, my own qualms about this entire episode are not about the substantive intrusion of the Charter on Quebec language policy, but rather about the process through
which this was accomplished.
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rather different lesson. When a nation confronts the grand question of how best to protect fundamental rights in a democracy,
what it needs even more than moral purity is political artistry.
By that standard, the new Canadian version as yet deserves only
mixed reviews.

